By Kavi Chongkittavorn
The Nation
Published on June 15, 2009
HERE LIES THE DILEMMA: Asean's old members want a new Asean while new Asean members want an old Asean. For the former, the new Asean means a more open and dynamic grouping that would not hesitate to embrace broader international norms, protect human rights and promote democratic values. For the latter, the old Asean means the preservation of status quo at all costs citing the mantra of non-interference, including the non-peer reviews.
Over the weeks, the contradiction within Asean has deepened and has been made more visible through Asean responses to the plight of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners and the drafted term of reference of the Asean human rights body (TOR-AHRB). In the past four decades, Asean members were pretty good in hiding their dirty linen. They could do so simply because their leaders were willing to keep their mouths zipped and were protected by their colleagues. Every agreement or protocol of Asean was done in good faith - non-biding without any provision for sanctions. Members' commitment and moral responsibility were the only enforcers, abstract as they were. That helped explain why only 30 per cent of some 220 plus agreements were ratified or implemented. The rest have been mired in the whirlpool of Asean bureaucratic polity.
From now on, the only instrument that can unite Asean is the Asean Charter as all members were involved in the drafting at every step. During the drafting process, the new members (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Burma) spearheaded the debates and eventually shaped the charter's substance and idealism. Imperfect as it is, the charter is now considered a tool kit that would take the grouping to the next level. The huge challenge ahead is how to enforce and interpret the charter. Such an endeavour could either further divide or consolidate the 10-member grouping.
WARINESS TO COMMIT
Strange but true, even though the charter was the outcome of consensus and compromise, quite a few Asean members are having problems committing to objectives and norms therein which they approved earlier. Burma and Laos have emerged as two prominent members that constantly invoke the principle of non-interference. Vietnam and Cambodia, while still valuing the concept, are more willing to accommodate with a more liberal interpretation. This will be immediately put to the test when Vietnam assumes the Asean chair next year, and Cambodia in January 2012.
Asean was founded in 1967 with only five members, and in 1976 they jointly drafted the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, which turned out to be Asean's most important document and widely-accepted regional code of conduct (the US plans to accede to the treaty next month in Bangkok). They did so enthusiastically as they were determined to prevent outside interference, especially from the major powers. They did not want to be pawns in the power struggles during the Cold War. However, the principle of non-interference was not meant to serve as a panacea to hide members' incompetence and oppression of citizens.
NON-INTERFERENCE IS PIVOTAL
That explains why the non-interference in internal affairs is one of the 14 principles contained in the charter's Article 2.2. The oft-quoted principle can no longer be used in isolation without considering other mandates entailing shared commitment and collective responsibility among members. Equally pivotal are the enhanced consultations on matters related to peace and prosperity and issues seriously affecting the common interest of Asean. The Asean chair's statement on the situation in Burma and Suu Kyi on May 19 was the outcome of such a realisation. The statement was reaffirmed by Asean foreign ministers when they met in Phnom Penh at the end of May on the sidelines of the Asean-EU ministerial meeting.
DECIDING ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Another challenge would be the future direction of TOR-AHRB. Next month the Asean foreign ministers will vet the final draft of TOR-AHRB in Bangkok. The contentious point remains whether the AHRB prime objective is to promote or protect human rights. Some members like Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand commonly wish the human rights body to provide maximum protection for Asean citizens. They have been trying to push for country visits, cross-border investigation of human rights abuses and periodic reviews to be included in the TOR-AHRB.
Obviously, the opponents want to protect governments in power and pay lip service to human-rights protection. To them, human-rights promotion is more palatable.
Ironically, all Asean members are subjected to the UN Human Rights Council's norms and standards. Each Asean member, like the rest of its UN colleagues, has to go through periodic reviews on human rights at the global level. It remains a mystery why Asean nations refuse to do the same within the regional human rights body. This kind of double standard policy is quite prevalent within Asean. The same was true for the aborted plan to set up an Asean peacekeeping force, initiated by Indonesia, back in 2003. Seven out of 10 Asean members, involving more than 3,000 troops, have participated in various capacities and forms with 19 UN peacekeeping operations around the world. None of them has joined together to keep peace under the Asean flag. Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines took part in the peacekeeping operations in East Timor in 2000.
Under the 2005 Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, Asean, Burma and UN agencies are currently working together to coordinate plans to help the rehabilitation of Cyclone Nargis' victims. Asean can only deliver humanitarian assistance but without helping the Burmese victims directly.
Asean leaders should go a step further, demanding more engagements with the victims directly in the future. No provisions under this agreement prevent Asean members from doing so.
In the past few months, Asean leaders have been discussing ways and means to maintain the so-called Asean centrality in grappling with new challenges and establishing strong partnership with global players.
To do so, Asean members understand they must comply faithfully with the charter's objectives and norms through new flexibility and pragmatism, even if they have to go against rogue members.
The Nation
Published on June 15, 2009
HERE LIES THE DILEMMA: Asean's old members want a new Asean while new Asean members want an old Asean. For the former, the new Asean means a more open and dynamic grouping that would not hesitate to embrace broader international norms, protect human rights and promote democratic values. For the latter, the old Asean means the preservation of status quo at all costs citing the mantra of non-interference, including the non-peer reviews.
Over the weeks, the contradiction within Asean has deepened and has been made more visible through Asean responses to the plight of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners and the drafted term of reference of the Asean human rights body (TOR-AHRB). In the past four decades, Asean members were pretty good in hiding their dirty linen. They could do so simply because their leaders were willing to keep their mouths zipped and were protected by their colleagues. Every agreement or protocol of Asean was done in good faith - non-biding without any provision for sanctions. Members' commitment and moral responsibility were the only enforcers, abstract as they were. That helped explain why only 30 per cent of some 220 plus agreements were ratified or implemented. The rest have been mired in the whirlpool of Asean bureaucratic polity.
From now on, the only instrument that can unite Asean is the Asean Charter as all members were involved in the drafting at every step. During the drafting process, the new members (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Burma) spearheaded the debates and eventually shaped the charter's substance and idealism. Imperfect as it is, the charter is now considered a tool kit that would take the grouping to the next level. The huge challenge ahead is how to enforce and interpret the charter. Such an endeavour could either further divide or consolidate the 10-member grouping.
WARINESS TO COMMIT
Strange but true, even though the charter was the outcome of consensus and compromise, quite a few Asean members are having problems committing to objectives and norms therein which they approved earlier. Burma and Laos have emerged as two prominent members that constantly invoke the principle of non-interference. Vietnam and Cambodia, while still valuing the concept, are more willing to accommodate with a more liberal interpretation. This will be immediately put to the test when Vietnam assumes the Asean chair next year, and Cambodia in January 2012.
Asean was founded in 1967 with only five members, and in 1976 they jointly drafted the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, which turned out to be Asean's most important document and widely-accepted regional code of conduct (the US plans to accede to the treaty next month in Bangkok). They did so enthusiastically as they were determined to prevent outside interference, especially from the major powers. They did not want to be pawns in the power struggles during the Cold War. However, the principle of non-interference was not meant to serve as a panacea to hide members' incompetence and oppression of citizens.
NON-INTERFERENCE IS PIVOTAL
That explains why the non-interference in internal affairs is one of the 14 principles contained in the charter's Article 2.2. The oft-quoted principle can no longer be used in isolation without considering other mandates entailing shared commitment and collective responsibility among members. Equally pivotal are the enhanced consultations on matters related to peace and prosperity and issues seriously affecting the common interest of Asean. The Asean chair's statement on the situation in Burma and Suu Kyi on May 19 was the outcome of such a realisation. The statement was reaffirmed by Asean foreign ministers when they met in Phnom Penh at the end of May on the sidelines of the Asean-EU ministerial meeting.
DECIDING ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Another challenge would be the future direction of TOR-AHRB. Next month the Asean foreign ministers will vet the final draft of TOR-AHRB in Bangkok. The contentious point remains whether the AHRB prime objective is to promote or protect human rights. Some members like Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand commonly wish the human rights body to provide maximum protection for Asean citizens. They have been trying to push for country visits, cross-border investigation of human rights abuses and periodic reviews to be included in the TOR-AHRB.
Obviously, the opponents want to protect governments in power and pay lip service to human-rights protection. To them, human-rights promotion is more palatable.
Ironically, all Asean members are subjected to the UN Human Rights Council's norms and standards. Each Asean member, like the rest of its UN colleagues, has to go through periodic reviews on human rights at the global level. It remains a mystery why Asean nations refuse to do the same within the regional human rights body. This kind of double standard policy is quite prevalent within Asean. The same was true for the aborted plan to set up an Asean peacekeeping force, initiated by Indonesia, back in 2003. Seven out of 10 Asean members, involving more than 3,000 troops, have participated in various capacities and forms with 19 UN peacekeeping operations around the world. None of them has joined together to keep peace under the Asean flag. Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines took part in the peacekeeping operations in East Timor in 2000.
Under the 2005 Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, Asean, Burma and UN agencies are currently working together to coordinate plans to help the rehabilitation of Cyclone Nargis' victims. Asean can only deliver humanitarian assistance but without helping the Burmese victims directly.
Asean leaders should go a step further, demanding more engagements with the victims directly in the future. No provisions under this agreement prevent Asean members from doing so.
In the past few months, Asean leaders have been discussing ways and means to maintain the so-called Asean centrality in grappling with new challenges and establishing strong partnership with global players.
To do so, Asean members understand they must comply faithfully with the charter's objectives and norms through new flexibility and pragmatism, even if they have to go against rogue members.
