International Herald Tribune
August 5, 2008
The Preah Vihear temple
The article "Dispute over temple ensnared in Thai politics" (July 21) ignored some salient facts, resulting in a misleading picture of Thailand's position on the standoff over the temple of Preah Vihear.
Thailand has strictly complied with the International Court of Justice's 1962 ruling, which pertained only to the temple, not to the boundary line. In 2000, Thailand and Cambodia set up a joint border commission to survey and demarcate the two countries' common land border. Pending this work, both sides agreed not to do anything that might change the environment of the frontier zone. However, Cambodia put in troops, a community and various structures. Thailand lodged repeated protests, to no avail.
When Thailand learned of Cambodia's desire to list the temple as a World Heritage site, we strongly urged Cambodia to do it jointly. This would have made the most sense: Natural access to the temple is from the Thai side and the rest of the complex is within Thailand.
Cambodia, however, decided to go it alone. In its initial application to the World Heritage site committee, Thai territory was included in the area to be designated. After Thailand protested, Cambodia submitted a revised map, proposing for designation only the temple proper. Since it no longer intruded into Thai territory, this was the map that Thailand "signed off on." We had to withdraw our support, however, following the Thai Administrative Court's interim injunction on the issue. This had no effect on the World Heritage committee's decision. While recognizing Thailand's repeated calls for a joint nomination and withdrawal of support, the committee approved the temple's designation on the World Heritage list on its own merits.
Contrary to the article's assertion, therefore, Thailand's response was neither "strangely passive," nor did Thailand fail to "insist on joining Cambodia as a bidder for the Unesco designation."
The Thai government remains optimistic that whatever their differences, both sides will do their best to avoid armed confrontation. In Siem Reap on July 28, our foreign ministers agreed to exercise the utmost restraint and to resolve the issue peacefully through existing bilateral mechanisms. We look forward to resolving the matter amicably with Cambodia.
Chainarong Keratiyutwong Bangkok Director of press division, Department of Information Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand
After the Olympics
In his article "Beijing's Catch-22" (Views, Aug. 5), Victor Cha joins the debate concerning the effects of the Olympic Games on Chinese domestic and foreign policy. Cha supports the argument made by other China specialists who claim that Beijing's current policies in Tibet, Sudan and Burma are driven mainly by a desire not to tarnish China's image before the Games.
But what will happen after the Beijing Olympics?
Indeed, if we accept the premise that Beijing is responding primarily to pressures on its image, then what incentives will exist for China to continue behaving responsibly after the Games are over?
Marc Sellès, Montreal
The air is so polluted you can't see across the street. Underage Chinese gymnasts will compete. Some of the press coverage may be censored, along with the Internet. Dissidents have been arrested and Tibetans tortured. No protests will be permitted.
And China was chosen to act as host to the Olympic Games. What am I missing here?
Joseph Distler Villajoyosa, Spain
August 5, 2008
The Preah Vihear temple
The article "Dispute over temple ensnared in Thai politics" (July 21) ignored some salient facts, resulting in a misleading picture of Thailand's position on the standoff over the temple of Preah Vihear.
Thailand has strictly complied with the International Court of Justice's 1962 ruling, which pertained only to the temple, not to the boundary line. In 2000, Thailand and Cambodia set up a joint border commission to survey and demarcate the two countries' common land border. Pending this work, both sides agreed not to do anything that might change the environment of the frontier zone. However, Cambodia put in troops, a community and various structures. Thailand lodged repeated protests, to no avail.
When Thailand learned of Cambodia's desire to list the temple as a World Heritage site, we strongly urged Cambodia to do it jointly. This would have made the most sense: Natural access to the temple is from the Thai side and the rest of the complex is within Thailand.
Cambodia, however, decided to go it alone. In its initial application to the World Heritage site committee, Thai territory was included in the area to be designated. After Thailand protested, Cambodia submitted a revised map, proposing for designation only the temple proper. Since it no longer intruded into Thai territory, this was the map that Thailand "signed off on." We had to withdraw our support, however, following the Thai Administrative Court's interim injunction on the issue. This had no effect on the World Heritage committee's decision. While recognizing Thailand's repeated calls for a joint nomination and withdrawal of support, the committee approved the temple's designation on the World Heritage list on its own merits.
Contrary to the article's assertion, therefore, Thailand's response was neither "strangely passive," nor did Thailand fail to "insist on joining Cambodia as a bidder for the Unesco designation."
The Thai government remains optimistic that whatever their differences, both sides will do their best to avoid armed confrontation. In Siem Reap on July 28, our foreign ministers agreed to exercise the utmost restraint and to resolve the issue peacefully through existing bilateral mechanisms. We look forward to resolving the matter amicably with Cambodia.
Chainarong Keratiyutwong Bangkok Director of press division, Department of Information Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand
After the Olympics
In his article "Beijing's Catch-22" (Views, Aug. 5), Victor Cha joins the debate concerning the effects of the Olympic Games on Chinese domestic and foreign policy. Cha supports the argument made by other China specialists who claim that Beijing's current policies in Tibet, Sudan and Burma are driven mainly by a desire not to tarnish China's image before the Games.
But what will happen after the Beijing Olympics?
Indeed, if we accept the premise that Beijing is responding primarily to pressures on its image, then what incentives will exist for China to continue behaving responsibly after the Games are over?
Marc Sellès, Montreal
The air is so polluted you can't see across the street. Underage Chinese gymnasts will compete. Some of the press coverage may be censored, along with the Internet. Dissidents have been arrested and Tibetans tortured. No protests will be permitted.
And China was chosen to act as host to the Olympic Games. What am I missing here?
Joseph Distler Villajoyosa, Spain
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