Kambol (Phnom Penh, Cambodia). 27/05/2009: Duch on day 22 of his trial at the ECCC
©John Vink/ Magnum
Ka-set
http://cambodia.ka-set.info
By Stéphanie Gée
27-05-2009
While his international co-lawyer suggested that the trial may turn his client into a “scapegoat”, Duch again referred, on Wednesday May 27th, to the demands of a vertical communication system in which he only obeyed the orders of his superiors in the Khmer Rouge regime. However, U.S. expert, Craig Etcheson, who was able to testify at last in the afternoon, put forth other elements that qualify this stance markedly and, on the contrary, did not relieve the accused of his responsibilities.
All communication went through the higher echelon
After presenting on the previous day nine letters sent to the accused by Sou Meth, former commandant of division 502 of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, international co-Prosecutor Alex Bates sought to establish whether Duch and Sou Meth communicated directly. Duch invariably replied that following the principle of absolute verticality that prevailed under the Khmer Rouge, all communication had to go through the higher echelons, in this case, through Son Sen, chief of staff of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea and deputy Prime Minister in charge of national security. Duch sent lists of names of individuals to be arrested to Sou Meth, who referred them to Son Sen, who, on the basis of their discussions, made a final selection of names. However, if the documents systematically passed through the hierarchy, the rule required that the names of high-ranking officials be concealed, under the name of “Respected Brother” or “Angkar”, like in this instance, Son Sen, then Brother nº2, Nuon Chea.
François Roux, Duch's co-lawyer, then intervened to point out to his colleague of the prosecution that his last question was repetitive, and invited him to listen more carefully to the answers given by the accused. He remarked that Duch knew more than him and would do a better prosecutor against himself than Alex Bates. The president agreed and invited the accused to keep silence. “Thank you for your kind encouragement,” the international co-Prosecutor replied, before pursuing his examination of the accused.
Shortly afterwards, judge Lavergne asked Duch why the names of high-ranking officials were concealed in these confidential documents, while their only addressee was perfectly aware of their identity and risks of leaks seemed non-existent. The accused explained the operating mode also amounted to a sign of respect to the superiors, but did not answer the question, although it was repeated to him until the French judge gave up.
If Duch admitted that the way he reported to Son Sen could have influenced his decisions – he specified earlier that he talked on the phone with Son Sen every two or three days, when it was not every night –, he again insisted that he was the one who had to answer the questions of his superiors and, in the end, he was only receiving their instructions.
Is Duch a scapegoat?
François Roux struck again, echoing his comments made at the end of the previous day, Tuesday May 26th: “I note that we have spent the whole morning interrogating Duch on letters he received from Sou Meth. Yet, [to counterbalance] there are no letters from Duch to Sou Meth and Sou Meth was not called for interrogation. Why is Duch here today on his own? Is Duch not being used as a scapegoat? I leave this question with you.” It was also another morning without hearing expert Craig Etcheson, whom the president thanked for his “patience”...
Ministries only in name
The U.S. professor, whose examination resumed in the afternoon, explained that “the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea [CPK] was the supreme body in charge, but this was the theory rather than the practice, as real power and authority rested with the Standing Committee of the Central Committee.” He then commented on the ministries of the Democratic Kampuchea government, which were only a façade, as they resembled “more a committee of the wider party to which authority was conferred to deal with a specific policy area.” Thereby deprived of the characteristics of ministries as they exist in a modern State, these structures were simply “members of the party who were given responsibilities in a particular policy area.”
S-21 unique in Democratic Kampuchea
Craig Etcheson returned to the “unique nature” of S-21, in comparison with other security centres in Democratic Kampuchea. He listed the reasons for this specificity: “S-21 was the security centre designated to smash people at the central echelon of Democratic Kampuchea and within the CPK structure […]. S-21 was therefore the only security office of Democratic Kampuchea that had the authority to detain, torture and execute individuals coming from the entire territory of Democratic Kampuchea. […] As part of my research into these issues over the last thirty years, I could observe that at the district level, a typical security centre had a staff of 10 to 15 people, at the sector level, the staff was a little bigger – 20 to 30 people – and at the zone level, the staff of security centres could have as many as 50 people or more. According to the document 'Combined statistics on the armed forces dated March 1977', S-21 featured in a unique category in terms of staff. It can be read that in March 1977, there were 2,327 people who worked at S-21. In my opinion, this indicates that S-21 was indeed a unique organ within Democratic Kampuchea.”
Between paranoia of a regime and zeal of its cadres
A few problems of translation and word clarifications later, Craig Etcheson was asked about the reasons for the important purges within the Ministry of Economy. He said the question was tricky but “at the heart of what this Chamber must rule on”: “On the one hand, it can be said that the purges carried out in the Ministry of Economy resulted from the paranoia of the CPK Standing Committee; on the other hand, it can be said that the purges resulted from the method used to weed out the enemies, as a methodology had been developed by the accused. Maybe both of these ingredients played a little role.”
On the issue of the constant purges that were rife within all the structures and throughout the country, he later added: “In light of a constantly changing direction and a very high degree of uncertainty, a significant degree of operational malfunctioning could be expected. To be clearer, it was very difficult to know what was happening and people were very scared. That being said, the CPK established as a priority obedience and discipline, as well as the strict implementation of the party line as defined by the party's supreme body. So, I would put forward that, in most places, most of the time, cadres did their best to implement the party line, at least to the extent they could understand it.”
The limits of Son Sen's supervision
“I would like to recall that Son Sen was a member of the CPK Standing Committee, that he was deputy Prime Minister in charge of national defence, that he was the chief of staff of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, so he was invested with many responsibilities,” Craig Echeson commented. “He must have been an extremely busy man. Today, the accused told us: 'My superior verified the interrogations of important individuals.' This is completely plausible. It would have been quite legitimate for Son Sen, in charge of domestic security, to be interested in the interrogation of some important prisoners and he would have made sure they were then eliminated. However, a look at the combined list of prisoners of S-21 established by the office of the co-Prosecutors reveals that many individuals who went through S-21 could not be considered as prisoners said to be important, in light of their responsibilities or ranks in the hierarchy. For instance, at the Ministry of Social Action, many female farmers, who were illiterate, had received a few hours of training to learn how to make injections, before being considered nurses and assigned in hospitals. An important number of them ended up in the torture chambers of S-21, on the basis of accusations that they were part of the CIA or KGB. It seems difficult to me to believe that someone with such heavy national responsibilities as Son Sen would devote time to the interrogation or execution of such staff...”
It was mandatory for communications to go through Son Sen: before the hearing was adjourned, the expert acknowledged this claim was only based on the words of the accused and reflected an inference made in light of the Khmer Rouge organisational functioning, but supported by no document.
Kambol (Phnom Penh, Cambodia). 27/05/2009: Co-Investigating Judges You Bun Leng and Marcel Lemonde, during a press conference on day 22 of Duch's trial at the ECCC©John Vink/ Magnum
The co-Investigating Judges in front of the journalists
At lunch break, following a new communication ritual at the court, a press conference was given by the co-Investigating Judges, this time. They announced that, further to having already interviewed 453 witnesses and 61 civil parties for case file 2, they had fixed an objective to wrap up the initial investigation phase of case 2 by the end of 2009. Judge Marcel Lemonde stressed it was an “ambitious” goal. It will then be followed by a series of “unavoidable procedural steps that do not depend on the co-Investigating Judges.” Indeed, parties can refuse to accept the investigation, request supplementary investigations, and if the judges refuse, file an appeal. “Only after this procedure of requests for actions is over will we be able to close the investigation phase and decide to refer the case.” For now, the four persons charged (Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith and Khieu Samphan) continue to take advantage of their right to remain silent, the judges specified. As for the question of a possible separation of their case files, the judges have not made their decision yet, saying they must strike a balance between the need to reach the trial stage as soon as possible, and respect for the rights of the parties, the defence in particular. They must therefore weigh the advantages and disadvantages of such a decision. Also in the pipelines is the decision whether to retain joint criminal enterprise as a form of criminal responsibility. The arguments of the various parties on this issue were posted on the website of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia. In conclusion, judge Lemonde recalled that while there were lots of talks here and there about corruption and interferences in the court, he had come here to work as a judge and he had been always been able to do so until now. “I have already said that the day I cannot do it anymore, I will leave, and I repeat that. As French poet Boileau said: 'Criticism is easy but art is difficult.'” A word to the wise...
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