The Jaharta Post
Rizal Sukma, Jakarta
October 21, 2008
Only a few days after all 10 members of ASEAN finally ratified the ASEAN Charter, Thailand and Cambodia gave the group a glimpse of what lies ahead. For months, the two members of ASEAN have been locked in a dispute over the ownership of an ancient temple, Preah Vihear, in the border area between the two countries.
Last week, troops from both sides were engaged in a gun battle, leaving two soldiers dead and several others injured. For the ASEAN Charter, the ratification of which is planned to be celebrated in Bangkok later this year, this conflict is a slap in the face. The charter's principle of resolving conflict through peaceful means could not prevent the two armies from attacking each other.
This feud between Thailand and Cambodia, which has the potential to turn into an open military clash between the two countries, is indeed the kind of problem that Indonesia had anticipated in 2003 when we proposed that ASEAN be transformed into an ASEAN Security Community (ASC).
Indonesia insisted at the time that ASEAN should have a platform that would make Southeast Asia a region characterized by the absence not only of war, but also of the prospect of war. We want to see an ASEAN where member states no longer view force as a viable instrument for resolving conflict. However, the rhetoric of war displayed by Thai and Cambodian military leaders over the past few weeks reminds us that such an ASEAN is still far from reality.
Indonesia believes that even within an ASC, disputes and conflict are still possible. But the key element of an ASEAN Security Community would be the avoidance of force as an instrument of conflict resolution. That is why Indonesia's original ASC Plan of Action (ASCPA) focused on a series of concrete measures that ASEAN states needed to undertake, in a collective manner, to resolve conflict peacefully; hence, the conflict resolution element of the ASC.
ASEAN member states, however, have always had many difficulties when it comes to the imperative of cooperating on real political and security issues through tangible measures. An agreement on concrete political and security cooperation is a rare occasion in ASEAN. Therefore, the final version of the ASCPA adopted by ASEAN leaders in Vientiane in November 2004 looks more like a collection of normative measures rather than a set of concrete actions aimed at creating an ASC.
As demonstrated in the experience of negotiating the ASC, ASEAN could only agree on principles but fell short of the ability and willingness to undertake concrete measures to produce real progress. Indonesia was perfectly aware of the limitations of ASEAN in this regard.
The current tension in Thai-Cambodia relations is only one such problem within Southeast Asia. Indonesia-Malaysia relations also often fall victim to the problem of territorial dispute, where the attempt to search for a peaceful solution has also been marred by use of the language of violence.
Of course, one can always argue that it will take time before ASEAN members finally renounce the use of force in managing their intra-mural relations. ASEAN's apologists tell us that as the habit of cooperation evolves, mutual trust will follow. They also argue that when this mutual trust is established, then member states will no longer need to resort to the use of force to resolve their differences.
It is precisely here that ASEAN's apologists make a categorical mistake. The problem with ASEAN is not that it lacks "process" but that it has too much "process" at the expense of "structure". ASEAN's biggest problem can be found in its hesitation to move toward greater institutionalization, toward a more legalized way of doing things and resolving problems, toward a greater commitment to enforce compliance.
Initially, we hoped the ASEAN Charter would be able to address those defects in the way ASEAN conducts its affairs. By adopting a flawed charter, ASEAN governments once again managed to frustrate those who wish to see ASEAN become a more progressive and effective organization. The charter, in its current form, will never be able to contribute to the realization of an ASC.
Therefore, ASEAN must realize that the charter will not be useful in creating an ASEAN community "at peace with itself and the world". If the charter cannot even force member countries to subscribe to the principles embodied in the charter itself, then there is no alternative for ASEAN but to return to the original spirit behind the ASC idea.
The opportunity is still there. Member states are now drafting the ASC Blueprint, to be submitted at the summit in Thailand by the end of the year. It is absolutely imperative that the ASC Blueprint does not suffer the same fate as the charter.
The drafters of the blueprint must realize that if they want to prevent conflicts among member states, such as the current row between Thailand and Cambodia, then the blueprint should recapture the spirit embodied in Indonesia's original concept of about the ASC: Bold and practical, but at the same time realistic.
The writer is the deputy executive director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta.
Rizal Sukma, Jakarta
October 21, 2008
Only a few days after all 10 members of ASEAN finally ratified the ASEAN Charter, Thailand and Cambodia gave the group a glimpse of what lies ahead. For months, the two members of ASEAN have been locked in a dispute over the ownership of an ancient temple, Preah Vihear, in the border area between the two countries.
Last week, troops from both sides were engaged in a gun battle, leaving two soldiers dead and several others injured. For the ASEAN Charter, the ratification of which is planned to be celebrated in Bangkok later this year, this conflict is a slap in the face. The charter's principle of resolving conflict through peaceful means could not prevent the two armies from attacking each other.
This feud between Thailand and Cambodia, which has the potential to turn into an open military clash between the two countries, is indeed the kind of problem that Indonesia had anticipated in 2003 when we proposed that ASEAN be transformed into an ASEAN Security Community (ASC).
Indonesia insisted at the time that ASEAN should have a platform that would make Southeast Asia a region characterized by the absence not only of war, but also of the prospect of war. We want to see an ASEAN where member states no longer view force as a viable instrument for resolving conflict. However, the rhetoric of war displayed by Thai and Cambodian military leaders over the past few weeks reminds us that such an ASEAN is still far from reality.
Indonesia believes that even within an ASC, disputes and conflict are still possible. But the key element of an ASEAN Security Community would be the avoidance of force as an instrument of conflict resolution. That is why Indonesia's original ASC Plan of Action (ASCPA) focused on a series of concrete measures that ASEAN states needed to undertake, in a collective manner, to resolve conflict peacefully; hence, the conflict resolution element of the ASC.
ASEAN member states, however, have always had many difficulties when it comes to the imperative of cooperating on real political and security issues through tangible measures. An agreement on concrete political and security cooperation is a rare occasion in ASEAN. Therefore, the final version of the ASCPA adopted by ASEAN leaders in Vientiane in November 2004 looks more like a collection of normative measures rather than a set of concrete actions aimed at creating an ASC.
As demonstrated in the experience of negotiating the ASC, ASEAN could only agree on principles but fell short of the ability and willingness to undertake concrete measures to produce real progress. Indonesia was perfectly aware of the limitations of ASEAN in this regard.
The current tension in Thai-Cambodia relations is only one such problem within Southeast Asia. Indonesia-Malaysia relations also often fall victim to the problem of territorial dispute, where the attempt to search for a peaceful solution has also been marred by use of the language of violence.
Of course, one can always argue that it will take time before ASEAN members finally renounce the use of force in managing their intra-mural relations. ASEAN's apologists tell us that as the habit of cooperation evolves, mutual trust will follow. They also argue that when this mutual trust is established, then member states will no longer need to resort to the use of force to resolve their differences.
It is precisely here that ASEAN's apologists make a categorical mistake. The problem with ASEAN is not that it lacks "process" but that it has too much "process" at the expense of "structure". ASEAN's biggest problem can be found in its hesitation to move toward greater institutionalization, toward a more legalized way of doing things and resolving problems, toward a greater commitment to enforce compliance.
Initially, we hoped the ASEAN Charter would be able to address those defects in the way ASEAN conducts its affairs. By adopting a flawed charter, ASEAN governments once again managed to frustrate those who wish to see ASEAN become a more progressive and effective organization. The charter, in its current form, will never be able to contribute to the realization of an ASC.
Therefore, ASEAN must realize that the charter will not be useful in creating an ASEAN community "at peace with itself and the world". If the charter cannot even force member countries to subscribe to the principles embodied in the charter itself, then there is no alternative for ASEAN but to return to the original spirit behind the ASC idea.
The opportunity is still there. Member states are now drafting the ASC Blueprint, to be submitted at the summit in Thailand by the end of the year. It is absolutely imperative that the ASC Blueprint does not suffer the same fate as the charter.
The drafters of the blueprint must realize that if they want to prevent conflicts among member states, such as the current row between Thailand and Cambodia, then the blueprint should recapture the spirit embodied in Indonesia's original concept of about the ASC: Bold and practical, but at the same time realistic.
The writer is the deputy executive director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta.
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