THE STANDARD
By Yash Ghai
Criminal trials in international tribunals or a tribunal with national and international membership are increasingly being viewed as the only way to bring dictators, and other highly placed state officials, responsible for the misery of thousands to justice. The best-known instance of this kind of hybrid court is the Cambodian tribunal for trial of leading members of the Khmer Rouge regime. There are similarities with Kenya, and interestingly, Dr Kofi Annan played a key role in the establishment of the Cambodian tribunal.
In the mid 1970s, the Khmer Rouge, a communist party, committed to the "moral" regeneration of Cambodia, seized power and embarked upon the total re-organisation of State and society. Millions of people were forcibly moved out of cities into the country side, subjected to forced labour, humiliated, tortured, and killed- 1.7 millions of them, a quarter of the population.
In Cambodia, as in Kenya, a compelling reason for an international or a hybrid court is the weaknesses in the national legal and judicial system.
The Khmer Rouge regime had destroyed the previous system, including statute books and legal records, and killed such judges and lawyers as were unable to flee the country. Key members of the regime that came into power after the UN’s "rehabilitation" of the country with close association with the Khmer Rouge movement had little inclination to institute legal proceedings against those most responsible for the genocide and other crimes.
Unlike Kenya, the purpose of the special tribunal was not to deal with immediate or contemporary problems but the recent past. Its main objective was accountability to Cambodians for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge. There was an element of national reconciliation, perhaps more accurately, putting the past behind them.
It was also intended to repudiate emphatically the practice of impunity, which characterised past and present regimes.
It was to promote awareness among the people about the meaning of justice.
The international community played a key role in bringing peace in Cambodia after the collapse of the Khmer Rouge regime.
The UN helped to rehabilitate the infrastructure and the economy, and in the transition to democracy. After a general election and a new constitution, the UN was given a special role to monitor and strengthen the protection of human rights, with the assistance of the Secretary General’s Special Representative for human rights.
The process of negotiating and organising an internationally acceptable tribunal for trials of Khmer Rouge leaders started in 1997. Experts advised then Secretary-General Kofi Annan that, due to wide scale corruption among judges and prosecutors, and their subservience to the government, it was impossible for a local tribunal to conduct fair and credible trials. They also ruled out a hybrid court, being convinced that its Cambodian members would take orders from prime minister Hun Sen, who, along with some of his Cabinet colleagues, had previously been part of the Khmer Rouge. It recommended a fully international tribunal, sitting outside Cambodia, but in a neighbouring country, so that Cambodians could follow the proceedings. Annan favoured this approach.
The UN-Cambodia Agreement and the Status of the ECCC Law
After long and intense negotiations, in which almost all the points of a UN draft were rejected by the Cambodian government, and under pressure particularly from the governments of France and Japan, UN negotiators reached an agreement based largely on a 2001 Cambodian law, which envisaged a tribunal, which was part of the Cambodian system.
But the ECCC is detached from the Cambodian system, having a self-contained system of investigations, prosecutions, trials and appeals, unconnected to the rest of the national system. The UN was also able to extract the concession that although the tribunal would operate under Cambodia law (which included elements of international law), this could not be amended without consultation with the UN. And it agreed that if the ECCC did not or could not function independently in accordance with the Agreement, the UN would withdraw and provide no further assistance.
Structure of the ECCC
The principal organ is the Trial Chamber and the Supreme Courts Chamber. Following the French legal system, there are investigating judges who review the investigations conducted by the prosecutions and decide whether the case can proceed. There are also offices of the prosecutors and defence, supported by the UN.
The Supreme Court Chamber consists of four Cambodian and three international judges and the Trial Court of three Cambodian and two international judges. There are two co-investigating judges and two prosecutors, for each; one local and one international member. The local judges and prosecutors are appointed by the Cambodian Supreme Council of Magistracy (an independent, constitutional body), and the international by the same body from a list of nominees presented by the UN Secretary General. Thus the Cambodian authorities make the final decision even on international judges and prosecutors (although within limits) while the UN has no say on local judges. The appointments are made for the duration of the tribunal. The law says that judges and prosecutors, who should be persons of high moral character, integrity, impartiality and "shall be independent in the performance of their functions and shall not accept or seek instructions from any Government or any other source".
Decision making
The law enjoins all judges and prosecutors to "attempt to achieve unanimity in their decisions". If investigating judges or prosecutors cannot agree, the case proceeds, but either collectively or individually, they can refer the matter to the judges of a special court, the Pre-Trial Court. This court consists of five judges, three Cambodian (including the presiding judge) and two international, and may, by a vote of at least four judges stop the trial. The decision of the Trial Court is also made by at least four of the five judges; and that of the Supreme Court by at least five judges. When the court is divided, both majority and minority judgements must be delivered.
Administration of the ECCC
The ECCC has, at the insistence of the Cambodian government, no Registrar as head of the administration and representative of the court – only an Office of Administration, headed by a Cambodian appointed Director. This gives the Cambodian government great control over the administration, critical to the functioning of the tribunal. Numerous allegations of corruption have been made against the Cambodian judges and staff.
Funding of the ECCC
In principle, the UN is responsible for the expenses associated with the international participation, including salaries of international judges, prosecutors, defence and administrative staff, and security arrangements. The Cambodian government is responsible for the salaries of local judges, prosecutors and staff, and provides the premises. It is now clear that the trials will take longer than anticipated (even if no new additional persons are charged). The total costs will certainly exceed US$100 million (from the original estimate of around 19 million). The UN is expected to pick up at least 90 per cent. Cambodia has been reluctant to deliver its contribution and friendly governments have paid substantial sums for it.
Annan’s request for funding from the regular UN budget was rejected. Though there is a Trust Fund administered by the UNDP, there are always financial pressures, throwing into doubt the continued existence of the tribunal, the completion of trials of accused already indicted, and has a dampening effect on investigations for fresh indictments.
Jurisdictional issues
The applicable law is a combination of Cambodian and international law. The international crimes include genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Cambodian crimes (provided for under the ECCC law) include homicide, torture, religious persecution and destruction of cultural property in armed conflict.
Persons to be tried are "senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea (the Khmer Rouge regime) and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions recognised by Cambodia," between 1975 and 1979.
There was considerable discussion before the tribunal was set up as to who should be tried, and how many. The Cambodian government was anxious to limit the trial to two or thee persons. The expert team had envisaged about 20. Recently, it became public that the Cambodian prosecutor on the tribunal has refused to sanction any new prosecutions, contrary to the assessment of the international prosecutor. There is also the issue of the cut off date for prosecution, since atrocities have continued to be committed, implicating several senior members of the current government.
It is accepted that due to the problem of time and money, only a handful of accused can be tried in international tribunals. Still to restrict trials to old men, whom only intensive medical treatment can keep alive to stand trial, and who have freely admitted their guilt and remorse, seems to go against the whole idea of such trials.
Legal procedure and representation
The Cambodian rules of procedure apply but where they are unclear or inconsistent with international standards, "guidance may also be sought in procedural rules established at the international level".
The rights of the accused include the full protection ensured in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including presumption of innocence, fair and public hearing, and legal representation. The tribunal has recruited experienced lawyers who represent the accused.
Representatives of Member States of the UN, of the Secretary General, of the media and of national and international NGOs are guaranteed access at all times to the proceedings (unless publicity would prejudice justice). NGOs are playing a critical role in monitoring and identifying improper practices.
Protection of witnesses, experts, members of the ECCC
The Agreement says that witnesses and experts, the judges, or the co-prosecutors shall not be prosecuted, or subjected to any restriction on their liberty by the Cambodian authorities. They shall not be subjected by the authorities to any measure, which may affect the free and independent exercise of their functions.
Punishment, penalties, and amnesties
Cambodia is notorious for impunities that members and friends of the government enjoy as well as for the harassment of its opponents through prosecutors and judges. Constitutionally, pardons and amnesties can only be granted by the King, in his own discretion; in practice decisions on these matters are the prime minister’s. The Agreement forbids an amnesty or pardon for any persons who may be investigated for or convicted of crimes referred to in the present Agreement. Consistently with the UN practice, the maximum possible penalty is life imprisonment.
Experience
The institutions and rules for decision-making are complex, indeed cumbersome. They require constant negotiations between the international and local judges, prosecutors and administrative staff. The use of three languages and some tensions between judges trained in the common law and those in the civil law have added to the problems.
The Cambodian government has interfered in various ways in the work of the ECCC. In this way the weakness and corruption within the national legal system have infected the ECCC, instead of the ECCC influencing the conduct of local judges and prosecutors.
Lessons for Kenya
If the national regime is not interested in the punishment of perpetrators of crimes against humanity, and particularly if important members of the Government may have been implicated in the violence, it is exceedingly hard for the international community, particularly through a hybrid tribunal, to ensure that justice is done.
Secondly, criminal trials cannot achieve the variety of tasks (including "transitional justice") envisaged in Cambodia, and their tasks should be confined to impartial and thorough investigation, fair trials and punishment of the guilty.
Thirdly, structural features, including the balance between local and international components and the extent and form of funding, will determine the effectiveness of the tribunal.
Fourthly, it is important to have adequate systems of monitoring, both official and non-governmental. Looking at the recommendations of the Waki Commission, it seems that some of these lessons have been taken on board, and others should be included in the Statute of the Special Tribunal.
The Phnom Penh Post
