Kambol (Cambodia, Phnom Penh). April 30th 2009: The accused on the 15th day of Duch trial at the ECCC. ©John Vink/ MagnumKIa-set
http://cambodia.ka-set.info
By Stéphanie Gée
01-05-2009
The Trial Chamber started on Thursday April 30 the examination of the third topic out a total of seven that were put down on the schedule of debates, namely the political implementation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) in the S-21 detention centre, led by Duch. This introduction to the political line and orientations decided by the Party were much awaited by those who fear Case Number 2 (concerning former Khmer Rouge cadres Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith and Khieu Samphan) might never come before the Trial Chamber. If such thing happened, the following hearings will then offer a rare opportunity to have a closer look at the CPK and the ideological principles that shaped it.
The policy of smashing enemies
Nobody was allowed to release people sent to S-21, “and even Pol Pot, the most important protagonist among the Khmer Rouge, used to say he was not allowed to order the release of whoever had been arrested”, Duch says during the hearing. And even though mistakes occurred when people were arrested, that policy was implacably implemented “to ensure security and make sure that the secret of S-21 was well-kept”.
There was nonetheless one way of dodging the rule. The accused reports, as a side anecdote, the case of a dentist who ended up in S-21. “Uncle Nuon [Nuon Chea] declared: ‘Don’t kill the dentist, he must be alive to treat our teeth!’ Even he did not make the decision for his release! The only thing he could do was to make sure he stayed alive to work at S-21. This was the only thing we could do: not smashing people and keeping them alive at S-21 where they were kept in semi-detention, if I may use that expression.”
Duch, referring to the first document adopted in 1960 by the CPK at the time of its creation, which defines the strategic line and policy of the party, remembers that it was about “gathering important forces to fight the enemy”. Before 1970, he explains, “nobody was purged internally”. “The party did not wish to purge cadres internally before 1970 because the policy implemented was that of a mobilisation of forces [...]. And it is only afterwards that they started adopting this policy of smashing [...]. It is only from 1973 onwards that they started following what I shall call class struggle. [...] Afterwards, after the April 17th [1975] victory, they began showing their anger against the exploiting classes [...] When people were arrested, it was always in the name of class struggle!”
Duch shows on the overhead projector a document dated March 30th 1976 and allegedly issued by the CPK Central Committee, which shows several “decisions”. One of these states that “in order to set up the rules which shape our revolution and to “strengthen socialist democracy”, “the right to decide to smash inside and outside the ranks” is granted, on base levels, to the Permanent Committee in charge of the zone concerned; for administrations linked with the Centre, that right was given to the Committee of central administration; in independent sectors, The permanent Committee was in charge, and for the army, the military commander made decisions. Duch adds that it is the Central Permanent Committee led by Pol Pot which decided to allow those four groups to smash. “As a consequence, as I said yesterday [Wednesday April 29] the fate of those who were sent to S-21 or to other police bureaus was already sealed.”
Enemies evolving as days and months pass
Before April 17, 1975, the Communist party of Kampuchea fought against “imperialists, bourgeois, the feudal system and reactionaries”. Duch corrects his own words and says in French: “reactionary bourgeoisie”. After the “great” victory, the CPK sees enemies everywhere “so much so that we found ourselves isolated”. The former S-21 director enumerates: “Former base people, former soldiers and Buddhist chiefs.... They also attacked religions, education was abolished....”
The Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea: a mere “filter”?
Duch claims he never relied on the Constitution of the Khmer Rouge regime, dating back to 1976, when it came to teaching his staff since he estimated that it concealed the real political line of the party. Thus, the preamble to the Constitution mentions “the aspirations of the people of the whole of Kampuchea and of the whole of revolutionary army of Kampuchea, who would like Kampuchea to be independent, united, peaceful, neutral and not aligned, with sovereignty in its territorial integrity”. But, the accused points out, “Who is entitled to happiness?” Well, in that case, communists, including myself, used to say that it was for the farming class and workers!”
He continues: “Building an ideal society, within the limits of possibility, is part of a theory called historical materialism and according to which we went from feudal society to an ideal society”. This is why Duch explains he preferred resorting to the slogan he learnt in French at school: “It is up to people to decide, depending on their capacities, jobs and needs”. “After April 17, the ideal society I was looking for was based on that slogan! [...] A society that was fair, socialist...”
Polpotism, not Maoism
Duch recalls that after the April 17th victory, a slogan was widely broadcast: that of the “Great Leap Forward”, explained by the president of the presidium of the state of Democratic Kampuchea, Khieu Samphan. “I saw lies in those lines! I mentioned that Mr Khieu Samphan’s explanation was a lie. The great leap forward – what is this? Pol Pot evacuated the whole of Phnom Penh, smashed capitalists and smashed intellectuals and who was left? Only the working and farming class! [...] Was I pleased with that ideal society created by Pol Pot? It was horrible because many people lost their lives and in the end, there were only two classes! Looking back on it, what kind of society were we experiencing? Some western analysts say that Pol Pot was a student of Mao Tse Toung’s and followed his principles. But I would like to insist on that point: it was Polpotism, not Maoism! Pol Pot wanted to go further than the Chinese popular revolution! [...] When I observed what was going on back then, it left me speechless. Many people lost their lives and I could not say anything. This was beyond words! [...] Back then, I had no idea that half of my family had died! So why did I attend all those horrible events and not flee? But where would I have gone?” He adds, later: “I could not escape, I had to continue”.
And when purges in revolutionary ranks intensified in early 1977, Duch says he started to be “in a state of shock”. He apologises: “That was rather cowardly, I was not brave enough to say no, I continued to follow orders...”, with the obsession of saving his own life and spare his relatives.
Organisational structure
At the base, “the very roots of the Party”, according to Duch, were the cells. Higher up stood the sector committees, zone committees and, on top of everything, the Party’s Central Committee. If the statutes of the Party, drafted in 1960, stipulated that any member with ten years of service in the ranks could claim the position of member of the Central Committee, however, the 1970 statutes established ten criteria for admission within the central organ.
“This was a filter wanted by Pol Pot, to prevent members from the Party to be admitted within the Central Committee when they should not be”, Duch explains in reference to the rule stating the ten criteria of admissibility. In order to make a good impression, Duch says, people had to be neither considered as rightists nor as leftists”, “stay neutral and not disturb anyone”, work hard to particularly meet the first three criteria *, and have networks around. Duch was never upgraded to the Central Committee, he says, and would not have liked to be. “All I wanted was my life to be spared... I was scared of not living long!”
