Kambol (Phnom Penh, Cambodia). 25/05/2009: Judge Silvia Cartwright and Nayan Chanda, journalist and author of “Brother Enemy”, and witness, on day 20 of Duch's trial©John Vink/ Magnum (composite picture)
Ka-set
http://cambodia.ka-set.info
By Stéphanie Gée
25-05-2009
Nayan Chanda, author of Brother Enemy: The War After the War (1986) and long-time Indochina correspondent for the prestigious Far Eastern Economic Review, started his testimony on Monday May 25th at Duch's trial to discuss the armed conflict pitting Democratic Kampuchea against Vietnam. The journalist, currently director of publications at a research institute of U.S. university Yale, had access to officials of the Indochina peninsula, although he was unable to go to Democratic Kampuchea, and was able to understand the political, diplomatic and military issues for the enemy brothers. His testimony, based upon his book Brother Enemy, shed new light on the argument often used by former Khmer Rouge officials to justify their past actions, that is the existence of real expansionist intentions from the Vietnamese neighbour.
From border clashes to open conflict
Vietnamese and Cambodian communist forces have experienced a long history of conflicts, which climaxed in the period from 1975 to 1979. 1975 saw the start of operations to take over islands located in the Gulf of Thailand and claimed by both camps. These were followed by border clashes, initiated by the Khmer Rouge and, according to the latter, a failed attempt by Vietnam to favour a coup against the government of Democratic Kampuchea. In 1977, the Khmer Rouge intensified their attacks, to which the Vietnamese responded with limited forays into Cambodian territory. On December 25th of the same year, Cambodians made public the international conflict opposing them to their neighbours, by severing diplomatic relations with Vietnam “until the forces of the aggressor withdraw from Khmer territory.” Border clashes resumed with renewed vigour in 1978, before the Socialist Republic of Vietnam launched a final major attack, late 1978, which resulted in the fall of Phnom Penh on January 7th 1979.
Although, when they came to power, the Khmer Rouge claimed they would not tolerate any foreign military base on their soil, expert Nayan Chanda was sceptical that after their victory in Vietnam, the communists were able to maintain bases within Cambodia as they faced an important flow of refugees expelled from Cambodia – ethnic Vietnamese they had to take care of.
If he claimed his memory failed him as the facts were more than 30 years old, Nayan Chanda presented a clear account of the situation as an informed expert. He recalled the village, seen during a visit for the press organised by the Vietnamese authorities in March 1978, which appeared to him as if “devastated after being hit by a storm” after a Khmer Rouge attack. “In all my career as a reporter, I have never seen so many bodies of civilians killed in the most brutal manner and abandoned on the spot.” In October, the Vietnamese army responded by launching a military operation on Khmer soil. “In fact, it was a false attack with a fake withdrawal of their troops aimed to make the Khmer Rouge come out of their hiding places. But it did not have the dissuasive effect hoped for...”, he explained.
The many warnings of the Vietnamese
Late 1977-early 1978, the Vietnamese army deployed heavy artillery for offensives carried out on Cambodian soil. Despite the scope of the attack, “Hanoi did not want to start a full-scale war, but send a message to the Khmer Rouge if they persisted in their attacks.” The distinguished Indian journalist observed this also failed to have any effect. On the Democratic Kampuchea side, people living along the frontier considered as guilty of harbouring pro-Vietnamese feelings or being collaborators were targeted by mass purges from late 1977. Later, Nayan Chanda added: “From what I could observe and read, the Vietnamese were very careful to avoid provoking Khmer Rouge, except in the case of their occupation of two islands, until mid-1977. The first sign of the end of Vietnam's tolerance for the constant Cambodian harassment along their frontier occurred in July 1977, when their minister for Defence, Giap, was sent to inspect the frontier between the two countries. The visit, which could have been kept secret, was duly reported by the Vietnamese media, as a warning directed at Cambodians so they knew 'we were not going to tolerate this forever'.”
Vietnam was taken by surprise when it was attacked by the Khmer Rouge on April 30th 1977, day of the anniversary of the capture of Saigon by the communist forces and thereby day of celebration, when security was lighter. So was it by the attack of September 22nd, on a Saturday, Vietnamese officers' day of rest. “Added to information they received that Chinese military aid had started arriving in Cambodia, the two attacks led the Vietnamese to believe that Cambodian attacks on villages in the frontier zone were not simply a slightly irrational activity on their part. They thought that there may be a larger plan in which China may have had a hand. That was the context in which [Vietnamese minister for Defence] Giap's visit occurred...”, the Indian expert reported.
For the former correspondent of the Far Eastern Economic review, Vietnam's approach was “marked with caution towards the Khmer Rouge,” as the Socialist Republic hoped that some of the moderate elements within the Khmer Rouge ranks would be able to avoid going into an open conflict with their Vietnamese neighbour.
The obsessive fear of becoming a Vietnamese satellite
Nayan Chanda reported that “the Khmer Rouge's biggest concern was Vietnamese expansionism and that was the rationale which led to the conflict with Vietnam. […] The Vietnamese concept of 'special relationships' between the countries in the Indochina peninsula [referred to by Ieng Sary, the Khmer Rouge minister for Foreign Affairs, whom he met], coined during the fight against colonialism, was an element aimed to ensure the development and security of the three countries [Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos]. The Khmer Rouge disagreed completely with the approach, because they considered the 'special relationships' as a disguised attempt by Vietnam to take power in Cambodia and get hold of Cambodian territory.” To cheer up its troops on the front line, Democratic Kampuchea had spread a slogan in late May 1978: “a Khmer Rouge soldier is worth 30 Vietnamese soldiers”, which followed mass purges of Vietnamese sympathisers and ethnic Vietnamese in the Eastern zone. Yet, “for those who knew the situation, the Vietnamese were far superior,” he stressed.
A context of territorial disputes
Echoing the conclusions he drew in his book Brother Enemy, Nayan Chanda explained that Democratic Kampuchea's rationale in this conflict was found in a “hereditary animosity between Cambodia and Vietnam” and a fight for the control of islands in the Gulf of Thailand. Democratic Kampuchea therefore carried out a military action to prevent that its territory be “swallowed” by Vietnam. On the other side, Vietnam's action aimed to avoid domination by the country supporting Democratic Kampuchea, in other words China. Going further, the journalist recalled that “the framework for the Geneva conference in 1954 was the starting point for the development of Khmer Rouge ideology, which perceived Vietnam as a threat. And if you go back further still, back to the empire of Angkor, it covered a great part of the Indochina peninsula, which was since occupied here and there by Cambodia's historical neighbours, Vietnam and Thailand. […] At the Geneva conference, […] Vietnam obtained Northern and Southern Vietnam, and Laos took control of two provinces, while the Khmer did not any seat at the negotiation table. And 2,000 Khmer cadres were authorised to live in Hanoi and in Northern Cambodia. Here, there was indeed a Vietnamese intent to control the Indochina peninsula and expand that control through that special relationship demanded by Vietnam. That was the source of Cambodian concern. On the Vietnamese side, they had a long history of conflicts with China, and for nearly 2,000 years, they had tried to push back Chinese expansionist attempts. So, here, the Chinese were using Cambodia to harass the Vietnamese in their Southern part, in addition to carrying out actions in the North of Vietnam. These territorial disputes fuelled this fight. There were long-standing concerns regarding the fate of these countries and their territorial control.”
Khmer Rouge racism against Vietnamese
Nayan Chanda then called “fascinating” the “black book” published by the Khmer Rouge ruling authorities in September 1978 – a “mix of facts and fiction” according to him – as it gave “an idea of the nature of its authors' thinking.” He explained: “It is the way things are said that is interesting: at the beginning, there is an openly racist stance towards Vietnamese, which I think represented a fundamental motive behind all the massacres and atrocities. Because the black book described the Vietnamese as aggressive by nature […] and from then on, anyone with sympathy for or links with Vietnam are therefore Democratic Kampuchea enemies.” Shortly before, on May 10th 1978, Democratic Kampuchea broadcast a radio call to kill the Vietnamese, which amounted to a pogrom order against this nationality.
Defence denounces a “double procedural abuse”
When international co-Prosecutor Alex Bates launched into an endless series of questions aimed to verify the credibility of the sources used by Nayan Chanda for the writing of Brother Enemy, he was interrupted by François Roux, international co-lawyer for Duch, who said he was “losing patience.” The lawyer denounced a “double procedural abuse”: on the one hand, he recalled that the examination and cross-examination practice characteristic of the common law system has no place in civil law, especially since the Chamber already submitted the expert to a detailed examination. “If we continue to spend hours verifying the sources of each expert, we will still be in hearings next year. I again recall that there was over a year of investigation. The co-Prosecutors must return to that procedure, otherwise, it didn't serve any purpose, in which case it should be said so publicly!” On the other hand, Roux continued, “I understand through the questions asked by the co-Prosecutors that they are building evidence for case file 2 [that of former Khmer Rouge leaders, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith and Nuon Chea]. That is not correct to try and record evidence against people who are not here...”
Alex Bates, making no secret of his irritation at the multiple objections of the defence, responded that Nayan Chanda had not been heard as witness during the investigation phase. Furthermore, he argued, the accused does not want to take a stance on those issues before 1977. Civil party lawyers all supported the co-Prosecutor and the Chamber followed suit, by stating that the objection raised by the defence lacked clarity, was ungrounded and therefore dismissed. However, the president invited the co-Prosecutors not to repeat questions already asked by the judges.
The examination resumed. The expert continued on Vietnam's reluctance to go for an open conflict with its neighbour, which would unavoidably involve other countries. He reported that the Vietnamese held a long-standing belief in a resolution of the conflict by expecting “either that Pol Pot became reasonable, or that more moderate elements within his party removed him from power.” The hearing was suspended. Nayan Chanda's examination will finish tomorrow. No one knows if U.S. expert Craig Etcheson will take his seat on Wednesday to continue his testimony
